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Abstract
The paper assesses the trade-creating impact of foreign-born residents on the interna-
tional imports and exports of the French regions where they are settled. The pro-trade effect
of immigrants is investigated along two intertwined dimensions: the complexity of traded
goods and the quality of institutions in partner countries. The trade-enhancing impact of im-
migrants is, on average, more salient when they come from a country with weak institutions.
However, this positive impact is especially large on the imports of simple products. When
we turn to complex goods, for which the information channel conveyed by immigrants is
the most valuable, immigration enhances imports regardless of the quality of institutions in
the partner country. Regarding exports, immigrants substitute for weak institutions on both
simple and complex goods.
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1 Introduction
Despite the widespread availability of modern communication technologies, information costs
still play a crucial role in shaping world trade patterns. As surveyed by Anderson and Win-
coop (2004), these costs, equivalent to an ad-valorem tax of 6%, largely account for the puzzling
persistence of distance and border impediments to trade.
According to Rauch (2001), social and business transnational networks are likely to alleviate
some of these information failures. Cross-border networks are prone to substitute for organized
markets in matching international buyers and sellers, and this is especially true of differenti-
ated products. In this respect, co-ethnic networks are of more particular interest, as illustrated
for instance by the model of Casella and Rauch (2003). Immigrants’ ties to their home country
may promote trade for at least three reasons. First, immigrants have a good knowledge of the
customs, language, laws as well as business practices in both the host and home countries. Ac-
cordingly, their presence helps bridging the information gap between sellers and buyers on both
sides, hence promoting bilateral trade opportunities. Second, immigrant networks may provide
contract enforcement through sanctions and exclusions, which substitutes for weak institutional
rules and reduces trade costs. In addition to the two previous channels, immigrants bring their
taste for homeland products, which should make their trade-creating impact even more salient
on imports.
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the relationship between trade and immigration
building on regional data for France. We investigate the pro-trade effect of foreign-born French
residents on the exports and imports of French de´partements with around 100 countries in the
world. The novelty consists in crossing the effect of immigration with both the quality of insti-
tutions in the home country and the complexity of traded goods.
The trade-promoting effect of immigration is now well documented (see Wagner, Head, and
Ries (2002) for an extensive review). Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998) and Girma and Yu
(2002) find a significant trade-creating impact of immigrants settled in the United States, Canada,
and the United Kingdom respectively. Rauch and Trindade (2002) exhibit a diaspora-network
rationale ruling this pro-trade phenomenon by showing that South-Asian country pairs with a
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higher proportion of Chinese immigrants trade more with each other.
However, there are many reasons to suspect that, at the country level, the correlation be-
tween trade and immigration might arise from omitted common determinants (such as colonial
ties, language or cultural proximity), or reverse causality if immigrants prefer to settle in coun-
tries that have good trade relationships with their home country.
Accordingly, a few recent attempts investigate the link between the spatial patterns of trade
and immigrants’ settlements within countries. Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002) are the first to
test a causal relationship between trade and immigration at the scale of Canadian provinces.
The inclusion of country fixed-effects allows to control for the common determinants of trade
and immigration at the national level. At the same time, cross-sectional variability in trade and
immigration at the regional level provides sufficient information to identify the pro-trade effect
of immigrants. The authors confirm the positive and significant elasticity of trade with respect
to immigration, at the regional level.
Further evidence is provided for the US states exports. Herander and Saavedra (2005) dis-
entangle the impact of both the in-state and out-state stocks of immigrants. The outstanding
impact of in-state immigrants pinpoints the key role of local social interactions as a major source
of technological externalities. Building on the same previous data set, Dunlevy (2006) further
shows that the pro-trade effect of immigrants increases with the degree of corruption and with
language similarity in the partner country. Finally, Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin, and Wall (2008)
explore the temporal scope of the data and regress the 1990-2000 time variation in trade on the
related time variation in immigrants’ settlements. This approach bears the advantage of con-
trolling for pair-specific unobserved characteristics. The pro-trade effect of immigrants is found
to exhibit a large heterogeneity driven by a few countries only. In a related strand of literature,
Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) for France and Millimet and Osang (2007) for the US
show that within-country migrations affect positively the volume of inter-regional trade flows.
Our paper extends this literature in three directions. First, the relationship between trade
and immigration is studied at a lower geographical scale than any previous North-American
study. French de´partements are almost 30 times tinier than American states and more than 100
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times smaller than Canadian provinces. A spurious correlation between trade and immigration
is thus less likely to occur at this very fine geographical scale. We do find that immigration
exerts a significant positive impact on trade: doubling the number of immigrants settled in a
de´partement boosts its exports to the home country by 7% and its imports by 4%.
Second, we address econometric questions endemic to gravity-type estimations. We first
tackle the issue of specification and selection biases due to zero flows, by resorting to the Quasi-
Maximum Likelihood estimator recently proposed by Head, Mayer, and Ries (2008b). We then
turn to the bias arising from possibly omitted common determinants for immigration and trade
or from reverse causality. To circumvent both sources of endogeneity, we include country- and
region-specific fixed-effects in the regression, and we resort to an instrumental variables ap-
proach, where lagged stocks of foreign-born French residents serve as instruments. The previous
orders of magnitude remain astonishingly robust to these econometric refinements.
Finally, we evaluate the heterogeneous impact of immigrants along two intertwined dimen-
sions: the complexity of traded goods and the quality of institutions in the partner country.
Indeed, Rauch and Trindade (2002) show that the trade-creating effect of Chinese networks is
larger for differentiated products than for homogeneous or reference price goods. The fact that
immigrants matter more for differentiated goods can be taken as a support for the information-
cost-saving channel of transnational networks. Besides, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and
Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006) show that the quality of institutions impacts drastically
on the volume of bilateral trade. Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006) point out that the qual-
ity of institutions matters more for complex commodities, which exhibit characteristics difficult
to fully specify in a contract. This is the reason why good institutions may reduce transaction
costs when contracts are more incomplete. However, they do not study whether transnational
networks could be a substitute for weak institutions, especially in the trade of complex products,
as suggested by Rauch (2001).1
Building on these insights, we disentangle the pro-trade impact of immigrants across both
the partner’s institution quality and the complexity of traded goods. In this respect, we em-
1In this respect, Dunlevy (2006) is a noticeable exception. He shows that the impact of immigrants on US state
exports is more important when institutions in the home country are weak.
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phasize two main results. First, immigrants especially matter for the imports of complex goods,
regardless of institution quality in the home country. Turning to the imports of simple products,
immigrants matter only when the quality of institutions at home is weak. Second, the trends are
less marked for exports. The pro-trade impact of immigrants on exports is positive only when
they come from countries with weak institutions, regardless of the complexity of products.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the augmented-gravity
specification we use to evaluate the trade-creating impact of foreign-born French residents, and
discusses several econometric issues. It also describes the trade and immigration data for French
regions. Section 3 presents the benchmark empirical results. Section 4 disentangles the trade-
creating impact of immigration across simple or complex products, and across countries with
different quality of institutions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model specification, econometrics and data
To investigate the pro-trade effect of social networks, we need a benchmark to evaluate the
amount of trade expected absent any immigrants’ settlements. Following Combes, Lafourcade,
and Mayer (2005), we present the gravity norm we use to provide this benchmark. This section
also discusses some of the econometric pitfalls traditionally encountered in gravity estimations.
The following presentation draws on the exposition of Head, Mayer, and Ries (2008a).
Model specification
The rationale behind the gravity model is that the value of trade between two locations
(yij) is generated by the adjusted economic sizes of both the supplying location i (Si) and the
demanding location j (Mj), and inhibited by all the sources of “trade resistance” between them
(φij):
yij = GSiMjφij (1)
G is a factor that does not vary across regions. Head, Mayer, and Ries (2008a) refer to Si and
Mj as the monadic terms, and φij as the dyadic term. The usual practice is to log-linearize this
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equation and to find proxies for the monadic and dyadic terms:
ln yij = lnG+ lnSi + lnMj + lnφij (2)
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) provide clear-cut theoretical micro-foundations for the monadic
terms: they depend on nominal economic size (for instance GDP), but also on non-linear func-
tions of all pairwise dyadic terms, called the “Multilateral resistance Indices” (hereafter MRIs).
A proper control for these monadic terms in gravity estimations is challenging.2 The primary
question we focus on is whether the spatial distribution of immigrants coming from a country j
affects the trade of hosting de´partements with such country. Hence, we are not interested in the
country- or de´partement-specific determinants of trade. This is the reason why we adopt a fixed-
effect approach a` la Anderson and Wincoop (2003), and introduce two sets of dummies in the
gravity equation. The inclusion of country fixed-effects (fj) is meant to control for all standard
country-specific determinants of trade: membership to a common trade or currency bloc (e.g.
the Euro Zone or the European Union), landlocked nature, colonial ties or common languages.
The other set of dummies (fi) controls for the de´partement-specific determinants of trade, such as
the density of economic activity or any natural or man-made endowments. Finally, it is worth
noting that, in this two-way fixed-effect setting, only the dyadic determinants (φij) of bilateral
trade can be identified.
Regarding this dyadic term, we follow Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) and assume
that trade costs do not only depend on distance and contiguity. They are also inversely corre-
lated with the number of immigrants coming from country j settled in region i. We choose φij
as a multiplicative function of (i) the great circle distance between i and j, (ii) a dummy indicat-
ing whether or not the de´partement and the country are contiguous,3 and finally (iii) the stock of
2Head, Mayer, and Ries (2008a) give a clear review of the state-of-art on the econometric specification of the
gravity equation. Four solutions are encountered in the literature: 1/ a non-linear approach, proposed by Anderson
andWincoop (2003), whereMRIs are explicitly computed, 2/ a fixed-effect approach, also proposed by Anderson and
Wincoop (2003), where monadic terms are controlled for by a set of importer and exporter dummies, 3/ the bonus
vetus OLS approach, proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and recently adapted by Behrens, Ertur, and Koch
(2007) based on spatial econometrics, where first-order Taylor expansions of MRIs are introduced in the specification,
and 4/ the tetrad approach, proposed by Head, Mayer, and Ries (2008a), where monadic terms are suppressed thanks
to the computation of export ratios.
3This dummy is equal to one for only a small subset of de´partements contiguous to Belgium/Luxembourg, Ger-
many, Switzerland, Italy or Spain.
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foreign-born residents in i originating from country j, migij :
φij = dist
β
ij(1 +migij)
α exp(γcontigij) (3)
We add an error term (ij) that controls for all unobservable dyadic terms uncorrelated with
distance, contiguity or immigrants’ stock. The baseline specification we estimate is thus the
following two-way fixed-effect log-linearized equation:
ln yij = fi + fj − β lndistij + γcontigij + α ln
(
1 +migij
)
+ ij . (4)
In what follows, we estimate this specification for exports and imports separately.
Econometric issues
Threemajor econometric problems are usually encounteredwhen estimating gravitymodels.
The first problem deals with the treatment of zero flows. The log-linearized specification (4)
can only be estimated on strictly positive flows. Various methodologies have been proposed
to control for the selection bias arising from keeping positive flows only. Dunlevy (2006) takes
the logarithm of one plus the value of the flow as a dependent variable. He also estimates a
Tobit model with an arbitrary zero threshold. Herander and Saavedra (2005) use the extended
Tobit estimation first proposed by Eaton and Tamura (1994), where the threshold is estimated.
This technique, also used by Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002), rests on a maximum likelihood
estimation of the log-linearized model.
A second issue concerns the heteroskedasticity of error terms in levels. In theoretical models
indeed, the gravity equation takes a multiplicative form, as in specification (1): hence, if the
error term in levels is heteroskedastic, OLS estimates for the log-linearized model are biased.4
To tackle simultaneously the zero-flow and the heteroscedastic issues, Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) initiated a novel approach by estimating the gravity equation in levels. They propose
4This is due to Jensen’s inequality, according to which the expected value of the logarithm of a random variable
is not equal to the logarithm of the expected value of this variable. Furthermore, the expected value of the logarithm
of a random variable depends not only on the expected value of the variable, but also on the other moments of its
distribution, especially the variance. Under heteroskedasticity in levels, this variance is a function of explanatory
variables, which generates endogeneity in the log-linearized model.
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a easy-to-implement Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (hereafter QML) estimation for the gravity
equation, under the assumption that error terms in levels are distributed according to a Poisson
distribution. These authors find that the elasticity of trade flows to distance is twice as small as
the one estimated from OLS. However, the Poisson specification builds on the assumption that
conditional variance equals conditional mean in the data, V(yij |xij) = E(yij |xij). Head, Mayer,
and Ries (2008b) provide a more robust 2-step Negative Binomial (hereafter 2NB) procedure that
allows the conditional variance to be a quadratic function of the mean, V(yij |xij) = E(yij |xij) +
η2E(yij |xij)2.5 Hence, in what follows, we compare baseline OLS and 2NB estimates in order
to test whether the pro-trade effect of immigrants is robust to these two presumably important
biases: zero flows and heteroskedasticity in levels.
The third issue is endogeneity, which may arise from two major sources: omitted variables
and reverse causality. At the national scale, one can imagine that preferential links between two
countries (resulting from a common colonial history for instance) generate simultaneously trade
and immigrant flows. Furthermore, the existence of a strong trade partnership may push people
to migrate, creating a reverse causality between trade and immigration. Gould (1994) provides
two reasons to believe that cross-section estimations actually preclude the endogeneity bias, at
the national level. First, migrations are expected to be more exogenous than trade flows, because
they are determined by family reunifications in the first place. As recently analyzed by Thierry
(2004), this is also a plausible explanation for France. Second, in addition to family entrance
motivations, immigration inflows are conveyed by wage differentials and the pre-existence of a
same native/speaking community, rather than by trade opportunities. This is alsowhat suggests
the analysis conducted by Bartel (1989) or Munshi (2003) for the US, and by Jayet and Bolle-
Ukrayinchuk (2007) for France.
Furthermore, these two sources of endogeneity are partially mitigatedwhenwe turn to infra-
national data. In specification (4), the country- and region-fixed effects control for a large set of
common observable and unobservable determinants for trade and immigration flows. Never-
theless, it could be argued that reverse causality and omitted variables are still likely to prevail
5Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984) show that QML estimators are consistent as long as the expected value
of the dependent variable is well specified, and thus robust to an error in the specification of the true data generating
process for the error term. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for further details.
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at the infra-national level. To be sure that this relationship is not driven by omitted variables,
Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002) control for the commonality of language, i.e. the probability that
a random citizen of a given region speaks the same language as a random citizen of the trading
partner. We cannot compute such a variable in the French case. We follow another route and in-
strument the current stock of immigrants with past stocks in 1975, 1982 and 1990. These lagged
stocks are valid instruments as long as they determine the current stock of immigrants, and do
not determine current trade flows beyond their effect on the current stock of immigrants. We
provide further support for this view in what follows. The instrumental variables approach has
been rarely implemented in the literature.6
Data
Trade data consists in the exports and imports of 94 French metropolitan de´partements with
around 100 countries. French decentralized customs services record the value of trade flows
exclusive of transit shipments, as well as the origin/destination of shipments, i.e. those where
goods are actually produced/consumed. Although trade values are available since 1978, we fo-
cus exclusively on the recent period to ensure data compatibility with immigrants’ stocks. Fur-
thermore, in order to prevent noisy observations due to time-specific shock (as the euro adop-
tion), we average trade flows over three years (1998, 1999 and 2000) for each de´partement-country
pairs.
Trade flows are originally available at a very disaggregated industrial level, according to
the Standard Goods Classification for Transport Statistics (NST/R classification). We match this
classificationwith the one proposed by Rauch (1999) to characterize the complexity or the degree
of differentiability of products.7
The 1999 French population census provides us with exhaustive information on the number
of foreign-born residents by de´partement and country pairs. We define immigrants as residents
born abroad with a foreign nationality. In the empirical part, we also use the lagged stocks of
immigrants to tackle the endogeneity issue. These figures are provided by French population
censuses for the years 1975, 1982 and 1990. Appendix A provides further details on exports,
6Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) stands as an exception.
7See Appendix B for details.
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imports and immigration data.
It is worth stressing that most of the variability in the data comes from the cross-country di-
mension of the sample. For instance, the regression of trade flows on country-specific dummies
returns an adjusted-R2 of 51% for exports, 61% for imports and 70% for immigration.
We wipe out this cross-country variation with a set of country fixed-effects. We also include
de´partement dummies to control for the common observable or unobservable determinants of
trade and immigrants inside France.
Due to the introduction of these two sets of dummies, the pro-trade impact of immigrants
is identified along the within-country and within-de´partement data variability. Table 1 depicts
the within-country and within-de´partement correlation between exports, imports, distance and
immigration.8 As expected, distance is negatively correlated with exports and imports, the cor-
relation being stronger for imports. By way of contrast, immigration is significantly and posi-
tively correlated with both exports and imports. Distance and immigration are also negatively
correlated, as it is well known that immigration flows also share a gravity pattern. Appendix A
provides further summary statistics on the data.
Table 1: Within-country, within-de´partement correlations
Variables Exports Imports Distance Immigrants
Exports 1.000
Imports 0.144 1.000
Distance -0.090 -0.137 1.000
Immigrants 0.066 0.043 -0.090 1.000
Note: All correlations are significant at the 1% level.
3 The pro-trade effect of immigrants
3.1 Benchmark results
Table 2 provides the basic results drawn from estimating specification (4). In columns labeled
OLS, we report the results drawn from the log-linear form (null flows are left out of the sample).
8More formally, this is the correlation between the residuals of the regression of each variable on country-specific
and de´partement-specific dummies.
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We also estimate the same specification in levels (columns 2NB). We run this regression twice:
first on the sample restricted to positive flows (columns (3) and (7)), and second on the whole
sample (columns (4) and (8)). We run two sets of regressions for exports and imports separately.
Table 2: Benchmark results
Exports Imports
OLS OLS 2NB > 0 2NB ≥ 0 OLS OLS 2NB > 0 2NB ≥ 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance -0.81a -0.777a -0.963a -0.961a -1.488a -1.480a -1.612a -1.638a
(0.089) (0.085) (0.1) (0.104) (0.128) (0.127) (0.143) (0.157)
Contiguity 0.452a 0.273c 0.123 0.099 0.445b 0.342c 0.029 -0.0009
(0.167) (0.163) (0.163) (0.169) (0.198) (0.201) (0.205) (0.237)
Immigrants 0.102a 0.091a 0.109a 0.054b 0.094a 0.089b
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.035) (0.041)
Obs. 9033 9033 9033 9400 8110 8110 8110 9494
Adj. R2 0.844 0.844 0.8 0.8
Note: Country and de´partement fixed effects are not reported here. Robust standard errors in brackets, with a, b and c
denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Log-linear specification
In columns (1) and (5), trade impediments are proxied by distance and contiguity only. Elas-
ticities have expected signs. Exports, as well as imports, decrease with distance and increase
with contiguity. The elasticity of imports to distance is twice larger than that of exports. Al-
though there is not any obvious reason for such a phenomenon, it is worth recalling that, in
this two-way fixed-effect setting, elasticities are estimated on the within-variability of the data.
Hence, identification relies drastically on close countries for which distance differentials across
regions remain high in comparison with countries located further away. For instance, Paris and
Marseille are almost equally distant from the United States, but not from Germany. For more
distant countries, the variability in distance is reduced. Nevertheless, the variability in trade
flows remains fairly high: a small difference in distance can be associated with a large difference
in trade values.
In columns (2) and (6), we add the stock of immigrants in the specification in logs. Contrary
to most of the previous regional studies, we are able to assess separately the impact of immi-
gration on exports and imports. Immigrants have a strongly significant impact. They promote
exports as well as imports: doubling their number yields a 7% (20.102 ≈ 1.07) increase in the
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value of exports and a 4% (20.054 ≈ 1.04) increase in the value of imports. The pro-trade effect
of immigration on imports is almost twice smaller than on exports. This casts doubt on the exis-
tence of a preference channel. However, we will see later that such a difference, which is barely
significant here, is in any case not very robust.
The impact on exports is also almost twice smaller than what has been previously found
for U.S. states exports. We argue that previous estimations could be tainted with an upward
omitted variable bias that can be controlled for by using country fixed-effects. The impact of
distance and contiguity is reduced when the stock of immigrants is accounted for. Contiguity is
only significant at the 10% level. Its impact reduces drastically once immigrants are controlled
for. Indeed, immigrants coming from neighboring countries, such as Belgium, Germany or Italy,
locate according to a gravity pattern. Consequently, the share of immigrants originating from
these neighboring countries is much higher in the regions behind the border than anywhere else
in France.
Specification in levels
We push further the evidence by testing the robustness of the results to two kinds of possible
biases: specification and selection due to neglecting zero flows in the log-linear specification.
Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) in table 2 report the results of the 2-step negative binomial esti-
mation procedure (equation (4) in levels). The positive and significant impact of immigrants is
confirmed. Furthermore, it is of the same order of magnitude than in the log-linear specification:
doubling the number of immigrants from a country yields a 6.5% increase in both the values of
exports and imports with this trade partner. Hence, the results do not change drastically when
moving to a log-linear specification. Furthermore, they are not driven by the zero-flow trunca-
tion. In columns (4) and (8), where null flows are included in the sample, results remain barely
the same.
Finally, we provide further robustness checks based on different estimation techniques (see
table 11 in Appendix C). The orders of magnitude are virtually the same in all procedures but the
Poisson QML estimation. This is probably due to the assumption that conditional mean equals
conditional variance, which would not be valid in our data. Therefore, the pro-trade effect of
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immigration is robust to both specification and selection biases. We now turn to the endogeneity
problem in the log-linear specification.
3.2 An instrumental variables approach
Despite the inclusion of fixed effects and the use of a fine geographical scale, our results could
still be plagued by the endogeneity of immigrants’ stocks. We use an instrumental variables
approach to circumvent this issue within the log-linear model.9 We choose the lagged stocks of
immigrants for the years 1975, 1982 and 1990 as instruments.
Relevance of instruments
In order to be relevant, instruments have to be correlated with the current stock of immigrants.
Hence, we should observe some persistence in the geography of immigrants’ settlements within
France, by country of origin. This is a well-known established empirical fact. For instance,
Jayet and Bolle-Ukrayinchuk (2007) find that, in France, past settlements strongly determine the
location of new immigrants, due to the existence of social networks or to family motives. Table
3 reports the pairwise correlations between past and current stocks of immigrants. We see that
these correlations are indeed fairly high, even though they decrease as time-lag raises. This is a
first support for validating instruments.
Nevertheless, strict relevance depends on the partial correlation between the endogenous
variable and the instruments, once the other exogenous regressors have been controlled for.
Table 4 reports the OLS estimates of the traditional first step of the 2-step instrumented regres-
sion. We further report the F-test of the joint significance of excluded instruments, as well as
the Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) partial R2 (BJB R2 herafter). As shown by Baum, Schaffer,
and Stillman (2003), in the case of a single endogenous explanatory variable, these tests are suf-
ficient to assess the relevance of instruments. According to the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of
thumb,10 our instruments are thus relevant. Nevertheless, in regression (4), the elasticity of the
1968 stock of immigrants is not significant. The weakness of instruments being often worse that
9Non-linear models, as the negative binomial model, remain quite hard to instrument, as reviewed byWindmeijer
(2006). Instrumenting is all themore challenging in our setting that we include numerous dummies. This is the reason
why, in this section, we exclusively focus on the log-linear specification.
10In the case of a single endogenous explanatory variable, a F-statistic below 10 is of concern. All our F-statistics
are far greater than 10.
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the endogeneity bias itself, we choose to remain parsimonious, and leave this instrument out of
the list.
Table 3: Pairwise correlations for instruments
ln(1+Immigrants 1999)
Correlation Nb. obs.
ln(1+Immigrants 1990) 0.92 8011
ln(1+Immigrants 1982) 0.92 5697
ln(1+Immigrants 1975) 0.87 4366
ln(1+Immigrants 1968) 0.79 4162
Note: All correlations are significant at the 1% level.
Table 4: Relevance of the lagged stocks of immigrants as instruments
Dependent variable: ln(1+ Immigrants 1999)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrants 1990 0.566a 0.503a 0.488a 0.505a
(0.007) (0.01) (0.012) (0.013)
Immigrants 1982 0.218a 0.242a 0.24a
(0.01) (0.012) (0.013)
Immigrants 1975 0.045a 0.061a
(0.011) (0.013)
Immigrants 1968 -0.012
(0.011)
Distance -0.055 0.106b 0.155a 0.146a
(0.047) (0.041) (0.038) (0.036)
Contiguity 0.854a 0.665a 0.573a 0.534a
(0.112) (0.094) (0.08) (0.075)
Obs. 8011 5471 4038 3558
Adj. R2 0.934 0.949 0.961 0.965
F (N1, N2) 6069.6 3969.4 2886.1 2285.2
N1 1 2 3 4
N2 7805 5306 3881 3400
BJB R2 0.44 0.6 0.69 0.73
Note: Country and de´partement fixed effects are not reported here.
Standard errors in brackets, with a, b and c denoting significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Supporting the validity of instruments
In what follows, we estimate two instrumentedmodels. In the first, we use the stock of immi-
grants in 1990 as the only instrument. This variable is actually the most highly correlated with
the endogenous regressor, and it is non-missing for most of the observations. Consequently,
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the model is just-identified and the validity of the instrument, which cannot be tested, must be
assumed. In the second model, we run a GMM-type instrumentation by introducing simulta-
neously the lagged stocks of immigrants in 1975, 1982 and 1990. Even though the number of
missing observations drastically increases, the model is now over-identified. Hence, we can test
for over-identification restrictions. We follow the suggestion of Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman
(2003) in the presence of heteroskedasticity, and run the Hansen-J test. A rejection of the null
hypothesis implies that the instruments do not fulfill the orthogonality conditions. Regarding
exports, the statistic is equal to χ2(2) = 0.45with a p-value at 0.8, whereas for imports, the value
is χ2(2) = 1.25, with a p-value at 0.53. In both cases, we thus fail to reject the null hypothesis.
The fail of the rejection of the null is a further proof of the validity of instruments.
Results from instrumented regressions
In the columns (1) and (5) of table 5, we estimate the log-linear specification for all the ob-
servations for which the stock of immigrants in 1990 is non-missing. This slightly reduces the
sample. The pro-trade effect of immigrants is broadly the same for exports and imports, with
an elasticity at 0.112. Doubling the stock of immigrants yields a trade increase of 8%. This is the
new benchmark against which we assess the endogeneity bias.
In columns (2) and (6), we report the estimates drawn from the just-identified model. In-
strumentation confirms the significant and positive impact of immigration on exports and im-
ports. Even though the elasticities are slightly reduced, which means that benchmark estimates
were plagued by a small upward endogeneity bias, the orders of magnitude remain fairly sta-
ble, around 0.095. To the best of our knowledge, no such a formal robustness check had been
proposed in the literature.
Columns (3) and (7) provide OLS estimates for the log-linear specification, based on the
country-pairs for which all past stocks of immigrants are non-missing. This reduces drastically
the number of observations. However, instrumented regressions reported in columns (4) and (8)
provide estimates that are not significantly different from OLS results. This confirms that, even
on this small sub-sample, the positive impact of immigration on trade is not driven by a reverse
causality or an omitted variable bias.
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Table 5: Instrumented regressions at the de´partement-level
Export Imports
Just-identified Over-identified Just-identified Over-identified
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance -0.704a -0.711a -0.62a -0.62a -1.533a -1.541a -1.318a -1.312a
(0.083) (0.083) (0.074) (0.072) (0.128) (0.127) (0.117) (0.115)
Contiguity 0.322b 0.357b 0.274c 0.281b 0.167 0.205 0.18 0.081
(0.161) (0.164) (0.142) (0.141) (0.196) (0.2) (0.192) (0.191)
Immigrants 0.115a 0.094a 0.162a 0.159a 0.12a 0.099b 0.186a 0.239a
(0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.025) (0.029) (0.041) (0.035) (0.042)
Obs. 7833 7833 4022 4022 7097 7097 3880 3880
Adj. R2 0.854 0.854 0.882 0.882 0.809 0.809 0.843 0.843
Note: Country and de´partement fixed effects are not reported here. Standard errors in brackets with a, b
and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
To sum up, immigrants do have a positive and significant impact on both exports and im-
ports. A doubling of the stock of immigrants increases the value of exports by 7 to 12%, de-
pending on the sample and the estimation procedure. The impact on imports, between 7 and
18%, is slightly more variable but of the same order of magnitude. We further find that these
results are robust to specification and selection biases and that endogeneity introduces only a
slight upward bias in OLS estimates.
4 Product complexity, quality of institutions and immigration
In this last section, we study the pro-trade effect of immigration along two intertwined dimen-
sions: the degree of complexity (or differentiation) of traded products, and the quality of insti-
tutions in partner countries.
The complexity of traded goods
Rauch (1999) is the first to argue that trade impediments would depend on the degree of
differentiability of traded products. He distinguishes differentiated goods from those sold on
an organized market or possessing a reference price. In a gravity-type model of international
trade, he provides convincing evidence that proximity, common language and colonial ties mat-
ter more for the former than for the latter. Using the same classification, Rauch and Trindade
(2002) even argue that the trade-creating impact of immigration, the Chinese diaspora in their
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study, is much more salient for differentiated than for homogeneous goods. Hence, transna-
tional networks would bridge the information gap between international sellers and buyers in a
more salient way for trade in differentiated goods.
We investigate a similar conjecture for French de´partements and their international trade part-
ners. We first match the NST/R industrial classification with the 4-digit SITC classification of
Rauch.11 We consider two types of goods only: simple and complex goods. Simple goods are
either those exchanged on an organized market or those possessing a reference price. Complex
goods are all the other ones, classified by Rauch as differentiated goods.12
We estimate now:
ln ykij = fki + fkj − β lndistij + γcontigij + αk ln
(
1 +migij
)
+ kij , (5)
where k indices the type of goods, with k ∈ (simple, complex). Exports and imports, as well as
country and de´partement dummies, are now commodity-specific. Whereas we assume that the
distance and contiguity effects do not vary across goods,13 the elasticity of trade with respect to
the stock of immigrants is also commodity-specific. Contrary to Rauch and Trindade (2002), we
run two separate regressions for exports and imports.
Table 6: Product type and immigration
Exports Imports
OLS 2NB≥ 0 OLS 2NB≥ 0
Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex
Distance -0.775a -0.951a -1.492a -1.603a
(0.072) (0.086) (0.099) (0.124)
Contiguity 0.371a 0.19 0.425a 0.082
(0.143) (0.134) (0.155) (0.181)
Immigrants 0.141a 0.074a 0.123a 0.095a 0.029 0.075a 0.05 0.113a
(0.025) (0.018) (0.025) (0.022) (0.035) (0.027) (0.044) (0.043)
Obs. 17711 18800 15396 18988
Adj. R2 0.809 0.766
Note: Country and de´partement fixed effects are not reported here. Robust standard errors in brackets, with a, b
and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
11See Appendix B for further details.
12Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006) follow the same dichotomy. Results are not drastically changed if we
consider three categories separately.
13Allowing these elasticities to be commodity-specific does not change the estimates of the impact of immigrants.
However, it reduces the precision of the distance and contiguity estimates but, as noted above, this remains difficult
to interpret.
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Table 6 reports the OLS estimates for specification (5) in log (columns OLS) and the 2-step
negative binomial QML estimates for specification (5) in levels (column 2NB≥ 0). A first striking
feature is that the trade-creating effect of immigration is now different for exports and imports.
Recall that, when the type of goods was not taken into account, the pro-trade effect of immi-
grants was of the same order of magnitude for exports and imports. By way of contrast here,
immigration boosts the imports of complex commodities (with an elasticity at 0.113), whereas it
has no significant impact on the imports of simple products.14 This is consistent with the idea
that social networks, by providing market information and supplying matching or referral ser-
vices, would matter more for the imports of complex products. Regarding exports, migrants
have a significant impact on both simple and complex goods. The effect would be even slightly
stronger for simple goods, even if the difference is not significant.
Such average elasticities could hide another source of heterogeneity, depending on the part-
ner country characteristics, as recently suggested by Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin, andWall (2008).
In the following, we disentangle further the pro-trade impact of immigration according to the
rules of law in partner countries, on aggregate flows first and then, by goods type.
The quality of the trade partner’s institutions
Some recent papers study the impact of institution quality on the volume of bilateral trade. In
a matching model of international trade, Turrini and van Ypersele (2006) provide new evidence
on the deterrent impact of legal asymmetries on bilateral trade between OECD countries, as
well as between French regions. Besides, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) establish that good
institutions would reduce predation at the border. They find that a 10% rise in a country’s index
of transparency and impartiality yields a 5% increase in its import volumes, other things equal.15
Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006) add that the quality of the exporter’s institutions mat-
ters even more. They argue that, if some common contracts (as letters of credit, counter-trade
agreements and pre-payment) exist to offset the exporter’s risk of not getting paid, such devices
are scarcer to offset the importer’s risk of late delivery and product defects. Therefore, formal
institutions, such as courts and arbitration tribunals for seeking compensation, are of primary
14In the remaining, we comment the results associated with estimations in levels only, differences with estimates
in logs being most of time insignificant.
15See also de Groot, Linders, Rietveld, and Subramanian (2004) and Ranjan and Lee (2007).
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interest for importers. Most of the time, the courts or arbitration tribunals in the export country
are indeed the last fallback for resolving disputes, the reason why the quality of institutions is
more important in the export country.
Rauch (2001) puts forward the idea that transnational networks could be a substitute for
weak institutions or weak mechanisms of arbitration. But, as far as we know, this effect has only
been empirically studied by Dunlevy (2006), who restricts the focus to U.S state exports. We
further investigate the conjecture of transnational network as a substitute for weak institutions
on both the international exports and imports of French de´partements. According to Anderson
and Marcouiller (2002), the impact of immigration should be greater for exports, as immigrants
mitigate any predation behavior at the border of the importing country. According to Berkowitz,
Moenius, and Pistor (2006), this should be the reverse as immigrants substitute for weak arbi-
tration tribunals in the exporting country.
Crossing the effects of migrants and institutions may allow us to identity which one of the
two previous views is the most salient. We use the rule of law index (hereafter RL) provided by
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) as a measure of the quality of institutions. This index
measures “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence”. This variable is thus very close to the reality we want to describe.16
We proceed with the following estimation:
ln yij = fi + fj − β lndistij + γcontigij + α ln
(
1 +migij
)
+ ρRLj ∗ ln
(
1 +migij
)
+ ij , (6)
where the (log of the) stock of immigrants is crossedwith the RL index in country j (RLj). In line
with Rauch (2001), we conjecture that immigrants from partner countries with weak institutions
have a larger impact on trade flows, in which case we expect a negative sign for ρ.
One could argue that the quality of institutions is endogenous to trade openness, and thus
16Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) provide six different measures of the quality of institutions. Due to
the strong correlation between these measures, we restrict the focus to the rule-of-law index. However, results are
unchanged when another index is chosen. The index is decreasing in the quality of institutions and stands between
−2.5 and 2.5. We proceed to a simple normalization so that our sample mean would be zero and standard deviation
would be one.
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to the volume of trade. If this assertion is certainly right in general, we can forcefully argue
that France remains a marginal trading partner for a large majority of countries in the sample.
Hence, bilateral flowswith France do not determine the quality of its trade partners’ institutions.
Moreover, the largest trade partners of France are high-income countries, where the quality of
institutions is already high.
Table 7: Immigration and the quality of the partner’s institutions
Exports Imports
OLS 2NB ≥ 0 OLS 2NB ≥ 0
Distance -0.839a -1.014a -1.510a -1.678a
(0.086) (0.108) (0.127) (0.16)
Contiguity 0.449a 0.265 0.451b 0.18
(0.172) (0.176) (0.206) (0.235)
Immigrants 0.085a 0.096a 0.047c 0.078c
(0.018) (0.02) (0.027) (0.04)
RL*Immigrants -0.067a -0.053a -0.042a -0.058a
(0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.02)
Obs. 9033 9400 8110 9494
Adj. R2 0.845 0.8
Note: Country and de´partement fixed effects are not reported here. Ro-
bust standard errors in brackets, with a, b and c denoting significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table 7 reports the estimates of specification (6). Note first that the direct trade-impact of
institution quality is captured by the country-specific dummy and thus, it cannot be separately
identified. Due to the normalization of the rule-of-law index to a zero mean, the average impact
of immigrants is taken into account via the Immigrants variable. It is almost the same as in section
3. The interacted term RL*Immigrants accounts for an heterogeneity in the immigrant effects
that depends on institution quality in partner countries. Our results support the conclusion
of Dunlevy (2006). The coefficient is negative for exports: immigrants matter more when the
quality of institutions is weak in the home country. We compute that the elasticity of exports
to immigration ranges between 0.16, for the last country of the first decile of institution quality
(Congo) to an insignificant 0.01 for the first country of the last decile (Netherlands).
In addition to Dunlevy (2006), we also provide the related estimates for imports. The im-
pact of immigration also presents a high heterogeneity. The elasticity ranges from 0.15 for the
first decile of institution quality to a zero effect for the last decile. Finally, the above-mentioned
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mechanisms by which weak institutions could impact on trade flows are not exclusive. How-
ever, immigrants mitigate the trade-reducing impact of weak institutions in both directions.
Complex products, quality of institutions and immigration
According to our previous discussion, the pro-trade effect of immigrants depends on both
the type of goods and the quality of institutions. Hence, it makes sense to study the triple
interaction. In the following, we evaluate the cross effect of institutions and immigrants for
simple and complex goods separately. Results are reported in table 8.
Table 8: Product type, quality of institutions and immigration
Exports Imports
OLS 2NB≥ 0 OLS 2NB≥ 0
Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex
Distance -0.856a -1.008a -1.527a -1.654a
(0.072) (0.089) (0.098) (0.126)
Contiguity 0.601a 0.389a 0.554a 0.299
(0.151) (0.143) (0.16) (0.183)
Immigration 0.118a 0.058a 0.107a 0.084a 0.023 0.07a 0.038 0.106b
(0.025) (0.018) (0.026) (0.022) (0.035) (0.027) (0.044) (0.042)
RL*Immigration -0.111a -0.065a -0.075a -0.05a -0.08a -0.023c -0.116a -0.024
(0.013) (0.01) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.02) (0.021)
Obs. 17711 18800 15396 18988
Adj. R2 0.806 0.766
Note: Country and de´partement fixed effects are not reported here. Robust standard errors in brackets, with a, b and c
denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
For exports, neither the direct impact of immigration nor its crossed effect with institutions
significantly differ between simple and complex goods. In both cases, immigrants enhance
trade, even more that the quality of institutions is low, which matches aforementioned intu-
itions. The direct effect is slightly stronger andmore heterogenous across rules-of-law for simple
goods.
Significant differences between commodities are observed on imports. Regarding the im-
ports of complex goods, the role of immigrants does not depend on the quality of institutions.
Since for complex goods immigrants are a real conduit for information, they matter regardless
of institution quality. For simple goods conversely, immigrants do not matter on average, be-
cause trading such goods does not require further information enhancement: hence, the direct
effect is not significant. This result holds unless the quality of institutions is low. In that case,
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immigrants, who substitute for institutions, play an important role, as shown by the negative
significant effect of the interacted variable.
5 Conclusion
The positive impact of immigration on trade is a well-established result. We add to the literature
by assessing the crossed effect of immigration, goods complexity and institution quality. Even
though numerous theoretical models underline this possible interaction, evidence remains very
scarce.
Whenwe do not disentangle the pro-trade effect of immigrants across goods and institutions,
we find that the trade-creating impact of immigrants is slightly smaller than that found in the
previous literature. This might be due to our careful estimation strategy, in which we consider
variables in levels, country fixed-effects and instrumentation. However, these average effects
hide a large heterogeneity across products and across trade partners.
The trade-enhancing impact of immigrants is more salient when they come from a country
with weak institutions. Doubling the stock of immigrants from countries with the weakest in-
stitutions increases exports and imports by 10 to 12%. Conversely, the impact of immigrants is
barely significant for countries with best institutions.
Furthermore, immigrants substitute for weak institutions for the exports of both simple and
complex goods. Regarding the imports of complex commodities, i.e. those for which the infor-
mation conveyed by immigrants is the most valuable, the pro-trade effect of immigrants over-
rides institution quality in the partner country. Conversely, even though immigrants do not
enhance the imports of simple goods on average, they play an important role in interaction with
the quality of institutions.
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A Data on trade and immigration
Trade flows
Trade flows come from the SITRAM data set provided by the French Ministry of Transport.
It reports the value of imports and exports of 94 French metropolitan de´partements with around
200 trading partners all around the world. French de´partements are administrative units of much
smaller and more regular size than US States or Canadian Provinces. The mean area of French
de´partements is 5,733 km2, with a coefficient of variation at 0.34 (when Corsica and overseas
French regions are excluded), whereas the related figures are 162,176 km2 (with a standard de-
viation at 0.77) for US states (when Alaska and Washington DC are included), and 606,293 km2
(with a standard deviation at 0.82) for Canadian provinces (when Nunavut, North-West and
Yukon territories are excluded). However, the instrumentation strategy requires that countries
remain comparable across time. And the decade 1990-2000 has seen a large deal of modifications
in the drawing of countries with, for instance, the disaggregation of the former Soviet Union and
of Ex-Yugoslavia. Hence, we recover those entities as they were before the separation:
• Four former single countries have been divided during the 1990’s. In order to match the
data set in 1999 with our explanatory variables, we thus aggregate Armenia, Azerbaidjan,
Belarus, Estonia, Georgy, Kazakhstan, Kirghistan, Lettonia, Lituania, Moldova, Ouzbek-
istan, Russia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan andUkrainia in a single former Soviet Union. Czech
Republic and Slovakia are aggregated in former Czecholovakia, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Mon-
tenegro, Slovenia and Macedonia in former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, Erythrea and
Ethiopia in former Ethiopia.
• We also aggregate three countries that have been reunified during the 1990’s: Germany
(former DDR and former GDR), Yemen (former South and North Yemen), and the Emi-
rates.
We further consider as a single country: 1/Belgium and Luxembourg, 2/Italy, San Marin
and Vatican, 3/Denmark and Feroe Islands, 4/Switzerland and Lichtenstein. After this manip-
ulation, 161 countries remain in the data set, with at least one positive flow towards or from a
French de´partement.
As noted in the main text, the value of trade flows is generally exclusive of transit ship-
ments. Petroleum products are however a noticeable exception. Hence, we leave them out of
the sample. We also neglect postal, pipers and other too specific shipments.
The distributions of exports and imports across countries are right-skewed, with a set of
few countries accounting for the largest amount of trade flows: nine countries only account
for more than 70% of the value of exports and of imports (Germany, Belgium/Luxembourg,
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, United-Kingdom, United-States, Switzerland and Japan). It is
also worth noting that half of the sample (80 countries) accounts for 98% (99%) of the value of
exports (imports). Furthermore, import and export countries are very similar: the Spearman
rank correlation between importers and exporters stands at 0.86.
Immigration
The 1999 French population census, from the French National Statistical Institute (INSEE),
provides uswith exhaustive information on the number of foreign-born residents by de´partement.
For each foreign-born resident, we know the country of birth, the nationality at birth, and the
nationality at the time of the census. We are then able to distinguish between 1/French citi-
zens born abroad, 2/foreign citizens born in France, 3/foreign citizens born abroad but having
acquired the French nationality, and finally 4/foreign citizens born abroad with a foreign na-
tionality at the time of the census.
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As the place of birth is more important in the construction of a social network than the cur-
rent nationality, we consider the narrower concept of immigrant. The French Statistical Institute
disentangles a foreigner, i.e. a person whose current nationality is not French, from an immi-
grant, i.e. a person born abroad with a foreign nationality, regardless of his/her nationality at
the time of the census. Hence, if an immigrant acquires the French nationality, he/she cannot
be considered a foreigner anymore, but remains an immigrant. Note that for a few countries,
it is necessary to sort apart French citizens born abroad from foreign-born French citizens. The
Algerian case is very enlightening in this respect. Eighteen French de´partements count more than
10,000 French citizens born in Algeria, who are not immigrants (Algeria was a settlement colony
of France until 1962). The settlement pattern of French citizens born in Algeria and Algerian-
born citizens is not completely similar, with a correlation at 0.64 only.
The distribution of immigration across countries is also highly right-skewed. Eight countries
account for more than 70% of immigrants to France (Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, Italy, Spain,
Tunisia, Germany and Turkey). Most of these countries do not stand in the top-9 French trading
partners. The geography of trade and immigration is thus quite different. The correlation be-
tween immigration and exports (imports) stands at 0.65 (0.56). This correlation is only 0.22 (0.20)
when we restrict the sample to countries belonging to the upper-median part of the distribution.
To prevent the results from being driven by noisy observations and the skewness of our
three variables of interest, we restrict the sample of exports, imports and immigration stocks to
the upper-median distribution countries. This leads us to consider a sample of 100 countries for
exports and a sample of 101 countries for imports.
Description of the instruments
The French population censuses of 1968, 1975, 1982 and 1990 provide us with a further re-
liable information on the number of immigrants by de´partement and by country of origin, used
as instruments to tackle the endogeneity issue. It is worth noting that, for earlier censuses (1968
and 1975), information is not exhaustive as it is extracted from a representative sample (1/4 of
the whole French population). Moreover, for these years, we only know the nationality of the
residents (and not the country of birth) for a limited number of countries. Hence, the number
of observations reduces drastically when we use these variables as instruments. The 1982 and
1990 censuses provide the nationality of the respondent, as well as his/her country of birth. We
are then able to recover an instrument variable closer to the endogenous explanatory variable.
Summary statistics
Table 9 depicts further summary statistics on the distributions of exports, imports, distance
and immigration over the de´partement-country pairs. In the panel of exports, there are 9033 pairs
(among 9400 possibilities) of strictly positive flows, against 8110 (among 9494 possibilities) for
imports, with a slightly greater pair-average value (31,980 thousands of euros against 30,443 for
exports). The frequency of null flows is then quite limited here, in comparison to Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) for instance (half of the sample).
B Matching the NST/R and Rauch’s classifications
The NST/R classification consists in a 3-tier nomenclature: 10 chapters, 52 groups, and 176 posi-
tions. We match each of these positions with the nomenclature built by Rauch (1999), who classi-
fies the 1089 goods of the 4-digit SITC (rev. 2) system into three broad categories: the goods sold
on an organized market, the reference price goods or neither of the two. Rauch (1999) provides
a conservative and a liberal classification. In the main text, we use the conservative one, but
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Table 9: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max
Strictly positive exports (9033/9400)
Exports 30443.2 134961.7 0.2 311.4 2122.5 12621.7 3500597.5
Distance 5321.9 3758.0 110.6 1956.8 4608.3 8358.1 19839.1
Immigrants 470.6 2224.0 0.0 7.0 29.0 140.0 56540.0
All exports (9400)
Exports 29254.6 132431.9 0.0 234.1 1848.3 11694.1 3500597.5
Distance 5338.8 3712.9 110.6 2021.2 4638.2 8325.4 19839.1
Immigrants 452.8 2181.9 0.0 6.0 27.0 131.0 56540.0
Strictly positive imports (8110/9494)
Imports 31079.7 151225.4 0.1 54.9 890.0 9076.8 4451061.5
Distance 5626.0 3933.6 110.6 1912.3 4983.7 8908.9 19839.1
Immigrants 519.2 2341.7 0.0 7.0 34.0 170.0 56540.0
All imports (9494)
Imports 26549.0 140197.3 0.0 7.2 392.2 6335.9 4451061.5
Distance 5577.7 3704.2 110.6 2238.5 4954.2 8615.1 19839.1
Immigrants 448.1 2171.6 0.0 5.0 26.0 128.0 56540.0
Note: Exports and imports are in thousands of euros, immigrants in number of foreign-born French resi-
dents. Distance is the average number of kilometers between capital cities, weighted by their population
size.
we check that the results are not sensitive to the alternative classification. We cannot define a
one-to-one mapping between the categories of Rauch, and the NSTR classification. Therefore,
we measure how each position distributes across these three broad categories.
To this aim, we use a correspondence between the 6-digit Harmonized Standard (HS6) and
the NST/R classifications on one side, and between the HS6 and the classification of Rauch
(1999) on the other side. The distribution of each position across the three Rauch’s categories is
computed as the ratio of the number of HS6 items belonging to each category over the number
of HS6 items composing a given position.
To compute a correspondence table between the NST/R and HS6 classifications, we first use
the correspondence table between the 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN8) and the NST/R
classifications provided by the European Statistical Institute (EUROSTAT). 17 We then use an-
other correspondence table provided by EUROSTAT for the year 1988 to match each CN8 item
with only one item of the HS6 classification.18
In order to compute a correspondence between the HS6 and the classification of Rauch
(1999), we use a correspondence table between the 4-digit SITC (rev. 2) and the 10-digit Har-
monized Standard (HS10) classifications provided by Feenstra (1996).19
Table 10 provides the distribution of each NST/R chapter across the three broad categories
defined by Rauch. As expected, differentiated goods mainly appear in chapter 9 (Machinery,
transport equipment, manufactured articles), and homogeneous goods in chapters 0 and 4.
17Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/other documents/index.cfm?TargetUrl=DSP OTHER DOC DTL
18Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/relations/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST REL
19Available at: http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/usixd/imports/conimp89 01.txt.
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Table 10: Distribution of the 9 NST/R chapters across Rauch’s categories (in %)
Chapters Label n r w
0 Agricultural products and live animals 19.69 25.87 54.44
1 Foodstuffs 19.26 67.6 13.13
2 Solid mineral fuels 13.77 86.23 0
4 Ores and metal waste 0 60.54 39.46
5 Metal products 29.91 63.56 6.53
6 Crude and manufactured minerals 66.6 33.4 0
7 Fertilizers 3.82 96.18 0
8 Chemicals 59.42 40 0.58
9 Machinery, transport equipment and manufactured articles 96.5 3.17 0.34
Note: n = Differentiated Goods, r = Reference Price Goods, w = Goods sold on an organized market.
Chapter 4 (petroleum products) is left out of the analysis.
C Robustness Checks
The first column of table 11 reports OLS estimates equivalent to those presented in table 2. The
second column, OLS(y + 0.1) gives the related estimates for the log-linearized model, where
the dependent variable has been replaced by the logarithm of 0.1 plus the flow (in thousands of
euros). This methodology has been used by Dunlevy (2006), Be´nassy-Que´re´, Coupet, andMayer
(2007) among others. The third column (ET − Tobit) gives the gravity estimates building on a
modified Tobit estimator, as suggested by Eaton and Tamura (1994). This method has been used
by Herander and Saavedra (2005).
The three following columns report QML estimates. The first column (2NB) depicts the
results of a 2-step Negative Binomial procedure similar to that of table 2. The second col-
umn (GPML) presents another QML estimator, where we assume that the error term follows
a Gamma distribution. The third column (PPML) depicts the Poisson QML estimates used by
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
Table 11: Results from different specifications
In Log In Levels
OLS OLS(y + 0.1) ET-TOBIT 2NB GPML PPML
Exports (> 0) 0.102a 0.101a 0.082a 0.092a 0.091a 0.24a
0.018 0.018 0.014 0.019 0.019 0.035
Exports (≥ 0) – 0.135a 0.077a 0.109a 0.113a 0.241a
0.021 0.013 0.021 0.021 0.035
Imports(> 0) 0.054b 0.055b 0.068a 0.094a 0.095a 0.208a
0.027 0.026 0.024 0.035 0.035 0.035
Imports(≥ 0) – 0.032 0.057a 0.089b 0.120a 0.208a
0.027 0.021 0.041 0.047 0.035
Note: Standard errors in brackets, with a, b and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels respectively.
28
